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Between Consultation and Collective Bargaining?  The Changing Role 
of Non-Union Employee Representatives: A Case Study from the 
Finance Sector 
 
Abstract 
This article reviews the roles and activities of non-union employee representatives acting as forum 
officers in a large internet finance company. Currently there is little academic coverage concerning 
the representatives themselves including contributions to workplace employment relations, the 
representatives own motivations and orientations to their representative role and tasks, as well as 
to management and fellow employees. An important pre-condition to answering one of the main 
questions asked of such new representatives is whether such representation constitutes the 
foundation of some nascent trade unionism or whether by acting as forum representatives they are 
positioning themselves to support management agendas and outlook? The data from this aƌtiĐle͛s 
longitudinal case study suggests that non-union representative͛ allegiaŶĐes and roles remain 
ambiguous, existing as they do in the intersection between consultation and collective bargaining. 
An important factor may be the capacity for independent action by the employee representatives. 
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Between Consultation and Collective Bargaining?  The Changing Role 
of Non-Union Employee Representatives: A Case Study from the 
Finance Sector 
  
This paper examines the emergence and development of employee representation at the greenfield 
site of a contact centre for a newly founded internet and telephone bank. While established by 
management at least in part to avoid the encroachment of trade union recognition, the 
representation which emerged, and the elected representatives, developed a sophisticated 
relationship with managers. While notionally based on consultation, relationship between 
representatives and managers has matured into a system of informal and formal discussions 
appearing strikingly similar to workplace collective bargaining.  In the last decade or so a set of 
actors have  become more prominent on the stage of UK employment relations, namely employee 
representatives whose role is independent of trade union and collective bargaining.  While some 
representative bodies may have earlier pedigree, rooted in long established joint consultation 
(Marchington, 1994), others have grown out of recent changes in employment regulation.  
Significantly, growth in non-union representation is attributable to EU (European Union) Directives 
on the Information and Consultation of Employees (EU ICE) Regulations (EU, 2002; Storey, 2005).   
This may appear the foundation of a dual system of representation but there has been deliberate 
government avoidance of instituting any system of works council in the UK (Hall et al, 2011) and less 
of any extension to joint regulations of the employment relationship. A recent booklet from Acas 
notes that: 
͞around half of employee representatives in the UK are non-union.  Their role tends to be 
much more restricted than that of their union counterparts, being limited in the main to 
consultation.͟ (Acas 2009, p.1) 
 
This tentative estimate, drawing from WERS (Kersley, 2006), rests loosely on a range of diverse roles 
played by employee representatives, some linked and others unlinked, to established representative 
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institutions (see also DTI 2007).  The DTI review of facilities for employee representatives estimates  
350,000 workplace representatives  equally divided between union and non-union representatives 
(NER). The review also offers a cost benefit analysis for the role of employee representatives in the 
UK: 
that workplace representatives bring an identifiable range of benefits worth £476 million 
- £1,133 million annually, in addition to which there may be significant other gains from 
increased productivity. The costs to their employers of providing paid time off and 
facilities ranged between an estimated £407 million to £430.4 million annually. (DTI 2007 
p. 9) 
These benefits may be aggregated , studies have indicated a boundary between union and non-
union representation; negotiation and collective bargaining has traditionally been seen as the very 
fundamental hallmark of union representation (Donovan, 1968) while non-union representation 
confined to information and consultation(Terry, 1999; Charlwood and Terry, 2007).  The absence of 
union involvement of NER representatives, by definition, means that they do not have any specific 
duties attached to union membership. Unlike  union rperesentatives NERs do not engage in 
recruitment of membership or to maintain subscriptions.  
While case evidence of these non-union employee representative bodies accumulates (e.g. Lloyd, 
2001; Watling and Snook, 2003; Bonner and Gollan, 2005; Butler, 2005;) there is little concerning the 
representatives themselves, what they contribute to workplace employment relations, the 
representatives own motivations and orientations to their representative role and tasks, as well as 
to management and fellow employees.  A move towards such an understanding would appear an 
important pre-condition to answering  one of the main questions asked of such new representation; 
whether such representation constitutes the foundation of some nascent trade unionism or, as 
͚ŵaŶageŵeŶt puppets͛ ǁhiĐh aĐt as a ďaƌƌieƌ to it, as Cooper and Briggs (2009) put it in the context 
of the AustƌaliaŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐe, as ͚TƌojaŶ hoƌses͛ oƌ ͚ǀehiĐles foƌ oƌgaŶisiŶg͛. As well as other interest 
in Australia (Markey, 2007), this has also be of interest in North America (Taras and Kaufman, 2006), 
and elsewhere (Kaufman, and Taras 2000). –  
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Methodology 
Here we will be considering the activities of NERs, by tracing the development of employee 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶts at ͚Interbank͛, a telephone and online bank operating through a 
contact centre. The longitudinal case study allowsfocus on ͚ĐƌitiĐal iŶĐideŶts͛, iŶfoƌŵiŶg 
understanding of the processes which led to particular outcomes principally by capturing the 
thoughts and feelings of employee representatives and other interviewees about such incidents 
(Chell, 2005). 
Initial contact with Interbank employee representatives came at a seminar in 2004 discussing the 
implications of the imminent introduction of the ICE regulations into the UK.  The first semi-
structured interviews were conducted at the contact centre in 2005 with intermittent visits until July 
2009.  No visits have been made to the smaller sites, the London head office and a much smaller 
contact centre, from which the company operated during the period. There were eight formal visits 
in total which ranged in duration from a few hours to full days. During the visits we interviewed 
employee forums officers together with HR department members; we also shadowed forum officers 
on their normal activities, observed consultations, offiĐeƌs͛ iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ a gƌieǀaŶĐe heaƌiŶg, and 
other day-to-day activity. Visits always iŶǀolǀed a ͚ĐatĐh-up͛ oŶ eǀeŶts siŶĐe ouƌ last ŵeetiŶg, where 
there tended to be a focus by the representatives upon critical incidents of the recent period, 
although these discussions also allowed structured or semi-structured interviews to confirm the 
unfolding events at Interbank. One of the interviews conducted with the employee chair of the 
forums used the WERS employee representative questionnaire (WRQ) as the framework for 
questions. On a further six occasions informal discussions were held offsite where we were about to 
review recent events and developments.  We also carried out interviews with the local union officer 
at Amicus principally to gain an understanding of attempts to introduce union recognition to the 
contact centre staff at the Interbank sites, but also to gain their perspective on Interbank 
representation.  One group we were not able to formally approach for the research were the 
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ordinary employees of Interbank to understand and reflect upon their views on representation.  
Because of their high profile the employee forums have been incorporated within a number of other 
research studies, including a case study by an independent consultancy, some of which have used 
the company name.  However we maintain anonymity of the company and the representatives – 
whose names we have changed for this account. This data, therefore, allows a longitudinal analysis 
of the maturation of Interbank system of employee voice and its representatives. In this we can 
explore the experience of employee representatives and representative forum that in other studies 
were often only captured as snapshot.  Butler͛s (2009) study indicated that research on NER has 
shifted from a focus oŶ hoǁ these ͚ŵaŶageƌiallǇ iŵposed͛ ;p. 198) bodies, once initially seen as 
means of excluding trade union representation, are now being understood in terms of their 
contribution to market objectives.  While we might accept that an increased maturity in research on 
NER is emerging, it might also indicate a gradual acceptance by employers of systems establishing 
employee cooperation (Gollan, 2007) aloŶgside eŵploǇees͛ aĐĐeptaŶĐe of legitimacy of eŵploǇeƌs͛ 
practices and procedures. It is far from clear how this maturity occurs within the organisations 
deploying NER.  In these accounts the actions and motives of the employee representatives remain 
undeveloped, presented as puppets of management without their own motive beyond an apparent 
deference to management.  Our approach to this question allows the employee representative voice 
as active agent in forming and shaping the representative process.  It also allows a more detailed 
exploration of the day-to-day activities of these representatives.   
Table One gives an indication of the character of the Interbank Employee Forum and, particularly, of 
the three full-time representatives.  In this we must note what Hyman (1997) indicates as the two 
diffeƌeŶt seŶses of ͚ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe͛, that ǁhile theǇ ŵaǇ aĐt as ͚ǀoiĐe͛ foƌ eŵploǇees iŶ the one 
sense, and particularly in terms of their age, they cannot be seen as representing ͞the main 
characteristics of the broader population͟ (p. 310) of Interbank employees where average age 
tended to be around mid to late twenties.  Another point which differentiates these three 
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representatives from the broader population is their longevity of service; all three were appointed to 
Interbank, from other parts of the company, towards the establishment of the company and, 
therefore, by the last interviews, they had in total approximately a decade of employment at 
Interbank.    
Our use of terminology differs from conventions in discussions concerning employment relations, 
stemming from difference in discussion of union and non-union representation. We refer to full-time 
officers as those – in this case three – employees of Interbank whose duties are solely concerned 
with a representative role.  Much of this paper consists of examining what constitutes this role and 
how it emerged, since it is continually formally and informally renegotiated. When referring to the 
foƌuŵ ǁe ŵeaŶ the ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe ďodǇ aŶd, iŶ ƌefeƌƌiŶg to ͚ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ǁe ŵeaŶ the eleĐted 
representatives to this body.  The latter clearly differs from the usual nomenclature for unionised 
workplaces. 
Table One: Full-Time Officers of the Interbank Employee 
Derek Male, 60s Employee Chair (Chair) 
Harry Male, 40s Deputy Chair 
Sue Female, 50s  
Interbank CEO is formally the Chair of the Forum. It also has up to 13 further part-time representatives for 
defined sites and sections of employees within Interbank.  Time for Forum duties from these employees is 
negotiable with line manager. 
 
The officers gave us access to copies of documentation, outlining and discussing their activities.  One 
of the officers, usually Derek the employee chair, produced a ͚ǁeeklǇ update͛ for circulation to 
members of the employee forum across Interbank. Meetings of all forum members as a body seem 
rare beyond the quarterly meetings held with the CEO. Spread sheets  were  kept by Derek and Sue, 
mainly accounting for their time to Interbank, indicating their specific activities. While Harry initially 
kept this record, the practice quickly lapsed.  These records provide a very rich source of data and 
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form the basis, along with interviews, discussions of offiĐeƌ͛s aĐtiǀities in the second part of this 
paper. However these need to be placed in the context of broader factors that shaped the 
emergence of the particular employment relations at Interbank.  Two key, interrelated, factors 
impacted on shaping representation beyond the requirements of changing regulation and the desire 
of management to exclude trade unions, these ǁe ŵight pose as the ͚iŶseĐuƌitǇ͛ faĐtoƌs. Fiƌst, this 
covered the insecurity of employment at the Interbank call centre where high levels of staff 
tuƌŶoǀeƌ, ƌepƌeseŶted a ǁoƌkfoƌĐe ŵoƌe ǁilliŶg to eǆeƌĐise ͚eǆit͛ thaŶ ͚ǀoiĐe͛ (Hirschman, 1970; 
Freedman and Medoff, 1984), particularly when presented with an employment problem (see also: 
Taylor et al, 2002; Mulholland, 2004).  This specific issue of staff turnover also had implications for 
IŶterďaŶk͛s managerial hierarchy; the rapid promotion, and turnover, in management posts 
permeating all levels of hierarchy from CEO downwards.  This issue also linked to a second area of 
instability, namely that of ownership.  On the open market for much of the decade, Interbank 
experienced three changes of ownership.  Each change heralded a new senior management – which 
itself changed more frequently than ownership – also some attempt at rationalisation and synergies 
with new parent companies.  
The Founding of Interbank and the establishment of employee representation 
Interbank was a product of the deregulation of UK finance established by a major insurance 
company in 1998, which we shall refer to as InsuranceCo, in its diversification into financial services.  
Interbank was initially meant to be a separately branded telephone bank specialising in credit cards 
and personal savings; it soon transferred to online services in the inflated environment of the 
internet bubble.  Interbank was floated on the London stock exchange in 2000 just as the dot-com 
bubble burst. While maintaining a base and small staff in its London head-office some staff and 
others were recruited, to its green-field contact centre established in the UK midlands.  Interbank 
quickly established a reputation for its quirky and idiosyncratic approach to employment, as well as 
offering a wide range of financial products.  
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Given that InsuranceCo had a long established trade union recognition agreement Amicus, the union 
concerned, expected this to be extended to Interbank.  As an HR Business Partner, transferred at 
start-up from InsuranceCo, explained: 
What we had at (InsuranceCo) was a uŶioŶ ǁhiĐh had a foothold … (InsuranceCo), it͛s a 
very traditional organisation while Interbank is very, very vibrant and quirky. (HR) brought 
a lot of polices from (InsuranceCo) but simplified them. … When the unions came in on 
the conversations here, (Interbank) was very, very firm and vigorous that there was no 
way they wanted a union here because they prided themselves on treating their people 
fairly anyway. … So my boss told me very, very, quickly - I think I was given about 48 hours 
… said ͚I ǁaŶt soŵe kiŶd of foƌuŵ. I doŶ͛t Đaƌe ǁhat it looks like, ďut I Ŷeed soŵethiŶg 
that ǁill ƌepƌeseŶt the people aŶd I ǁaŶt it doŶe ƋuiĐklǇ ͛. 
Therefore the initial impetus for the establishment of an employee representative forum appeared 
totally congruent with the argument that it was instituted as a barrier to trade union recognition 
(Gall, 2005).  Formally the forum met quarterly for what were referred to by one of the officers as 
͞fiƌeside Đhats͟ ǁith the CEO.  This clearly did not alleviate mounting problems for the workforce 
with complaints about working breaks as well as the general workplace environment. On one side 
the union continued campaigning for recognition at the contact centre, on the other the forum 
members felt marginal to the day-to-daǇ deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg, ƌestƌiĐted to issues of ͞sausages iŶ the 
canteen, tea and toilets stuff͟ (Derek).   
Every now and again we had a restructuring exercise when (Interbank) employees could 
lose their jobs. The (forum) were called in on a supporting role only. We were not 
consulted on redundancies, but only asked to comment. (Harry) 
Employee grievances prompted a demonstration by Amicus outside the gates of the Interbank 
contact centre, which may have provoked the senior management and forum officers to consider 
the forums progress and remit. While some elements within senior management may have been 
anti-union this was not, at least initially, the case with forum officers. Early activity of the forum 
ŵeŵďeƌ͛s involved direct engagement with trade unions. Derek had served elsewhere as a union lay 
representative and he and Harry had maintained trade union membership. 
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 (We) had no objection to Amicus coming on site and making representations to staff- we 
didŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe Đould saǇ Ŷo to AŵiĐus. We ǁeƌe eleĐted ƌeps, but we did not have the 
ear of Interbank people and we felt that we could not speak for them. (Harry) 
These views were echoed by the other forum officers, specifically that they were not trained for 
their roles and felt vulnerable to the threats posed by Amicus. 
If Amicus were going to come in here then we needed to work with them on an equal 
footing. We almost needed to get ourselves tooled up in terms of knowledge and skills 
because we knew those guys would have more training and experience than we had.  
(Derek). 
The foruŵ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ role had become one of explaining management policy and its implications for 
affected employees, although ͞ǁe realised that it Ŷeeded to ďe ƌaŵped up͛͛ (Derek). 
The forum member claimed that one of the possibilities, not objected to by senior management, was 
to work towards union recognition.  The union officer certainly thought that they had such an 
agreement all but signed. However, while accounts are rather unclear, it seems that some members 
of the forum were increasingly discontent with the union approach.  Specifically they did not want to 
be relegated to membership recruitment for the union; recruitment was not a role they had to 
perform although they did speak to new employees at induction. All Interbank employees were 
notionally represented by the forum without subscription.  At one of the meetings with the CEO 
Derek and Harry, at the time only part-time members of the forum, proposed a changing and more 
active role for the forum and each was given an eight month secondment to work on the idea, 
secondments that,  ǁeƌe to ͞oƌgaŶiĐallǇ default iŶto full-tiŵe ƌep͟ (Harry) positions.  
The outcome for the forum, as well as acquiring two full-time officers in Derek and Harry – shortly 
with Sue as a third – was an independent budget for the forum and greater independence from 
management and the HR Department. To attempt to bridge the training gap they first developed 
links with the TUC Partnership Institute although later drifting to the Involvement and Partnership 
Association.  Their constitution, hurriedly drawn up by HR and based on that for InsuranceCo EWC, 
ǁas ƌeplaĐed ďǇ a set of ͚ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts͛ to Interbank  ͚people͛ and the organisation was put in place. 
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These commitments identify the forum as the only mechanism through which employees are 
informed and consulted on operational workplace issues; the introduction outlines the forum 
objectives as ͚͚to iŶĐrease the leǀel of eŵployee iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ ĐhaŶges aŶd ďusiŶess iŶitiatiǀes 
ǁhiĐh affeĐt eŵployees usiŶg effeĐtiǀe ĐoŶsultatioŶ͛͛. Therefore, the forum never identified itself 
with negotiation or bargaining. The commitments document also incorporates a mission statement 
including theŵes of ͚representing the voice of all (Interbank) people, to make working life great and 
help driǀe superior ďusiŶess results͛. Since the change in early 2003 the forum and its officers have 
developed an individual and collective remit including involvement in salary structures, 
restructuring, employment – oƌ ͚people͛ - initiatives, communications, terms and conditions, bonus 
payments, flexible working and disciplinary matters.  
Forum Representatives: Roles and Activities. 
Surprisingly little is known about the actual activities of employee representatives.  In the 1960s and 
1970s, a period synonymous with the expansion and formalisation of union shop floor role (Hyman, 
1979) a number of studies were carried out (Lover, 1976; Nicholson, 1976; Partridge, 1977) which 
reinforced a view that they are priŶĐipallǇ eŶgaged iŶ ĐolleĐtiǀe ďaƌgaiŶiŶg as ͞talkeƌs ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
ǁƌiteƌs͟ (McCarthy, 1966, p. 10], that:  
The most time-consuming duty of stewards is negotiating with foremen and managers.  
Next come discussions with constituents or other stewards, followed by various formal 
meetings.  The consistency of the pattern is more remarkable than the minor variations 
from union to union. (Clegg et al, 1961, p. 180] 
In contrast, a study in the 1980s based on twelve weeks of shop steward diaries concludes that 
steǁaƌds aƌe ͞adŵiŶistƌatoƌs Ŷot Ŷegotiatoƌs͟ ;Schuller and Robertson, 1983), the main time spent 
with management was in consultation or related to individual or group casework (p339). Significant 
time was also taken in trade union activity, both recruitment and in branch and steward meetings. 
While studies have examined long term unionisation in the banking industry (Allen and Williams, 
1960) or more recent changes (Storey et al, 1997), or the changing role of the bank worker (Burton, 
1991),  currently literature overlooks the particular role of employee representatives in the finance 
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sector. ‘eĐeŶt ƌeǀieǁ of ǁoƌkplaĐe ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes͛ faĐilities aŶd tiŵe Đaƌƌied out ďǇ the, theŶ, 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI 2007; also Kersley, 2006) analysis, differentiates between 
union, non-union, and stand-alone representatives with union representatives being allocated 
significantly more time for their duties than the other two types although little is detailed as to what 
this time is allocated to (BERR 2007). Some recognition is given to particular roles – in Information 
and Consultation, Equality, Health and Safety, Learning Representatives, etc. – which are seen as 
discrete and independent of a ŵoƌe geŶeƌalist ͚shop steǁaƌd͛ ƌole aŶd to iŶdiǀidual aŶd ĐolleĐtive 
representation. 
Table Two: Hours spent by Full- Time Forums Officers on Classified Duties  
 Relation
ship 
Building  
Relationship 
Maintenance 
Awareness/
Context 
Setting 
Strategy 
& 
Planning  
Communic
ations 
Collective 
Consultation 
Individual 
Represent
ation 
2004/05 114.8 146.3 159.75 371.5 86.5 199 344 
2005/06 105 163 341 569 148 162 576 
2006/07 127 255 190 462 74 159 458 
Monthly 
Average 
17.74 29.62 36.96 71.69 15.98 27.97 74.51 
 
Table Two indicates the self-reported activity by two, and sometimes three, full-time non-union 
representatives at Interbank.  The categories are their own and aggregated from monthly 
breakdown. Given that occasionally Harry, the third officer does contribute, or that one of the other 
two may not submit, then little definitive can be drawn from the data.  However the assembling of 
such detailed data on activities, along with the clear resistance of one of the officers, might be seen 
as indicative of the performance culture at Interbank. The remainder of this section explores these 
categories using the weekly updates produced by the forum full-time officers and from accounts 
with representatives in semi-structured interviews.  Some of the categorisation employed needs to 
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be first explored before describing what might be viewed as more conventional individual and 
collective representation processes.  
 
Role and Activities of Interbank Employee Repesentatives 
Relationship Building and Maintenance 
CeŶtƌal to the philosophǇ of the foƌuŵs aŶd its offiĐeƌs ǁas the ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁith ͚ƌelatioŶships͛, the 
commitments document, in the section specifically focussed on employee-management 
relationships cites:  
͚All (Interbank) UK managers to be ďƌiefed aŶd eŶĐouƌaged to aĐkŶoǁledge the foƌuŵ͛s 
value for their departments. Forum reps are to attend meetings for information and 
iŶput.͛  
The ŶotioŶ of ͚ƌelatioŶship͛ ǁas ĐleaƌlǇ ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith the ƌhetoƌiĐ of a ĐoŵpaŶǇ ǁheƌe Đustoŵeƌ 
service is referƌed to as ͚ƌelatioŶship deǀelopŵeŶt͛ aŶd ǁheƌe ͚ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs͛ oĐĐuƌ ďut, iŶ ouƌ 
experience, rarely advanced beyond discussions, let alone formal negotiation. These processes 
epitomise at least the ideal of social engagement, as one of the representatives put it:  
͞If Ǉou haǀe a ƌelatioŶship Ǉou doŶ͛t alǁaǇs ŵake aŶ aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶt eǀeƌǇ ŵoŶth to see 
Ǉouƌ ŵuŵ.͟ ;Derek).  
MuĐh of the offiĐeƌ͛s tiŵe ǁas spent iŶ these ͚ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs͛ aŶd ŵeetiŶgs ǁith diffeƌeŶt ŵaŶageƌs, 
from the regular meetings with the CEO downwards. The weekly update catalogued the frequency of 
such meetings, as for example: 
͞;Sue) spent a large part of her time this week maintaining relationships with various 
managers, people leaders and departments. Sharing information in regular meetings, with 
Health aŶd WellďeiŶg, the CoŶtaĐt CeŶtƌe people leadeƌ … helps us all, I ďelieǀe, to 
understand what is actually happening in the business. From (a forums) point of view this 
always helps us to explain to (Interbank) people, the situations and business deĐisioŶs.͟ 
(Weekly Update January 2006). 
“iŵilaƌ deǀelopŵeŶts of ͚ƌelatioŶship͛ emerged with individuals or organisations outside of 
Interbank. To soŵe eǆteŶt, the estaďlishŵeŶt of ƌelatioŶships foƌŵalised the foƌuŵ͛s legitiŵaĐǇ aŶd 
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that of its officers, the latter formed a working relationship with the CEO, a pattern they sought to 
eŶgeŶdeƌ ǁith all ŵaŶageƌs. Hoǁeǀeƌ the ƌeasoŶs ǁhǇ ͚ƌelatioŶship ďuildiŶg͛ ǁas sepaƌated iŶ the 
data fƌoŵ ͚ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe͛ iŶ paƌt legitiŵaĐǇ. The site suffered from high levels of labour turnover 
with annual rates varying from around ten to forty per cent dependent on broader circumstances. 
Turnover - or attrition - rates were recorded by the weekly update report and at various times forum 
officers were in consultation over finding some means to reduce it. Employee turnover issues 
involved considerable effort from forums officers with managers, and weekly reports record 
continual attempts at relationship building meetings with new or problematic managers. Traditional 
collective bargaining requires workplace trade unions to spend considerable time policing the 
resultant agreements. By contrast the ͚ƌelatioŶship appƌoaĐh͛ atteŵpted to eŵďed ĐoŶsultatioŶ at 
all levels of the Interbank hierarchy, and in the absence of written agreement, required the officers 
to establish and sustain these relationships especially with a high level of management turnover.   
The attrition rate had other important consequences. Given the overall profile of  employees, those 
promoted were likely to be relatively young and inexperienced. The local union official commented 
that the Interbank HR policies and procedures were very good although problems emerged because 
of the inexperience of employees promoted into lower ranks of the hierarchy. This mismatch of early 
promotion with a lack of workplace experience led forum officers into many of the individual cases 
they covered.  In contrast, forum officers were older and more experienced than most managers, 
essentially outside of the normal Interbank hierarchy, with often a more thorough knowledge of 
procedures and practices than the HR Department.     
Awareness and Context Setting 
͚AǁaƌeŶess͛ was an important issue for the representative officers and forums, both in terms of  
advertising  their existence  and  working as a two way conduit of information between management 
aŶd ͚people͛ ďeĐause, uŶlike foƌ ǁoƌkplaĐe uŶioŶisatioŶ, theƌe is Ŷo ŵeŵďeƌship aŶd theƌefoƌe Ŷo 
recruitment role for the forum. However, offiĐeƌ͛s Ŷeeded to establish   their  activities and roles 
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within the corporate environment and context. Effort was also expended by representatives into 
constructing an independent identity from management across the organisation. Initially this was 
the acquisition of their own symbols: a banner about the forum identifying their location in the 
open-plan contact centre and an officers͛ sweatshirt.  Officers also contributed to the induction 
process making new staff aware of the existence of their representation roles and the employee 
forum. They also held ͚aǁaƌeŶess daǇs͛ ǁheƌe full aŶd paƌt tiŵe offiĐeƌs ǁeƌe aǀailaďle iŶ eaĐh of 
the sites to talk to employees – ͞Interbank people͟ - aďout foƌuŵs aĐtiǀities as ǁell as ͚ĐoŶteǆt͛,  for 
example, ǁhat ǁas happeŶiŶg ǁithiŶ ͚IŶterďaŶk͛.  These ͚aǁaƌeŶess daǇs͛ were held in public spaces 
near to cafes and restaurants oŶ site ǁheƌe ͚people͛ were likely to pass. Awareness days appeared in 
the forums weekly updates with any important outcomes in addition to communications across the 
company, typically:  
Thanks to all those who were able to participate in the awareness day on Wednesday. We 
had several points raised that we have been able to resolve. Overall, it appears that there 
is a very good awareness of (the forums); we will need to concentrate more now on what 
we do and what we have achieved. (April 22
nd
 2005) 
Clearly, these awareness raising roles and activities promoted the forums and its officers beyond a 
symbolic or cosmetic presence.  
Strategy and Planning 
AŶotheƌ iŵpoƌtaŶt aĐtiǀitǇ foƌ the ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes aŶd foƌuŵs ǁas ͚stƌategǇ aŶd plaŶŶiŶg͛, Ǉet it 
emerged as the most ambiguous as it was represented by the use of ͚ǁe͛.  Used interchangeably to 
refer to both the company and the forum, officers often referred to what ͚ǁe͛ are doing and it was 
difficult to identify whether they were talking about Interbank or forum strategy, or even if they 
differentiated. Strategy and planning therefore referred to two quite distinct activities; first, the 
development of strategy and also future planning for the forum itself.  This confusion could create 
tensions between representatives and senior management as concerns were sometimes raised by 
forum officers about their response to specific corporate changes. Second, consultation and 
information channels managed by Interbank became difficult to maintain often triggered by general 
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Interbank strategy and exacerbated by the changing ownership. Significant time was spent from the 
outset by the full-time officers in developing identity, at least an appearance of it, and their own 
independence from senior management. Forum officers responded to the frequent changes in CEO 
each heralding potential crisis through withdrawal of management patronage; a new CEO͛s might 
the chair of the forums or worse withdraw patronage to employee forums members with loss of 
legitimacy and even role for the officers.  
Communications 
CloselǇ ƌelated to ďoth ͚aǁaƌeŶess͛ aŶd ͚stƌategǇ͛ ǁas ǁhat offiĐeƌs Đategoƌised as ͚ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͛; 
where officers presented communications sessions at important junctures during the forums 
development. A feature of Interbank was presentations by senior management to involving the 
forum advising them about any changes to senior management personnel and company strategy. To 
some extent the forums officers attended to glean information, but often in communication sessions 
they had already been involved in prior ͚disĐussioŶs͛ oƌ ͚ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs͛ ǁith seŶioƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt. 
One example from a weekly update read as follows: 
There haǀe ďeeŶ thƌee ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs sessioŶs this ǁeek … outliŶiŶg the ĐhaŶges to the 
Technology leadership team. (Harry) and (Derek) attended the meetings that were well 
ƌeĐeiǀed ďǇ those iŶ atteŶdaŶĐe.͟ ;JulǇ 14th 2006) 
The attendance of the forums officers itself was perhaps intended to legitimate any decisions that 
were communicated in these sessions.  
Individual Representation 
The most time consuming activity for the forum officers concerned individual casework, particularly 
discipline and grievance procedures. We were given access to a database created by the officers 
covering these activities from 2004 to 2007. This data was cross referenced with the more anecdotal 
reference to casework as outlined in the weekly updates. Within the discipline and grievance 
procedure, forum officers attended disciplinary hearings with both managers and a representative 
from HR. Forum officers did not play an adversary role, as might be expected of a trade union 
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officer, but only monitored fairness and process. If advocacy was required then officers might even 
direct accused employees towards trade union representation. Extensive time might be taken 
outside the hearing itself in giving assistance or guidance on procedure and preparation. Table 3 
records 125 hearings although a few cases may be replicated as several hearings may be held: 
 
Table 3: Disciplinary Hearings Attended by Forums Officers 
 Hearings Appeals 
2004 30 10 
2005 33 5 
2006 50 16 
2007 (Jan – March) 12  
 
The database includes probation reviews where problems perhaps of employee misconduct and 
gross misconduct arose. The cases cover wide ranging issues expected in any workplace, especially 
where age profile is for younger workers.  Officers tended to see those employees who were 
disciplined as transgressors unable to adjust to work regulations after – or in fact alongside – student 
life. For example, in one case an employee, who had been on sick leave, was known to be attending 
University at the same time. Some incidents related specifically to Interbank status as financial 
institution and contact centre; incidents were recorded involving e-mail or internet usage. More 
direct fraud seems to have occurred, with employees accessing accounts or unauthorised use of 
systems or miss-selling of products. A few incidents were documented where employees were 
disciplined for call avoidance or rudeness to customers.   
Collective Consultation 
While one of the initial reasons for the establishment of the forum may have been union avoidance, 
its remit was also intended to comply with information and consultation regulations. For example, 
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the forum was consulted by senior management on redundancy and TUPE arrangements.  The 
foƌuŵs ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes͛ ͚ƌelatioŶship͛ ǁith these ŵaŶageƌs, according to the commitments 
document, also included the rights to ͚͚facilitate consultation on any development in particular areas 
or sections of (Interbank)͟: 
A local manager thinking about changing shift patterns comes to talk to us about – this is 
what my plan is, this is ǁhat I͛ŵ thiŶkiŶg; ǁhat do Ǉou thiŶk aďout it?  CaŶ I haǀe Ǉouƌ 
iŶput oŶ this?͟ ;Derek) 
In many respects, and despite this being low in rating of activities, consultation could be considered 
for forum officers as the defining activity - in the same way as collective bargaining is for trade 
unions.  However one of the most intriguing aspects of our data concerns the possible drift from 
consultation to bargaining. Consultation occurred between forum officers and management on a 
wide range of HR policies and practices.  Here the situation appears very similar to that outlined in 
͚FinanceCo͛ examined by Butler (2009) where another non-union forum has been established with a 
full time officer: 
͞the total corporate portfolio of around 30 HR policies, from whistle-blowing and criminal 
activities outside work to pensions and aspects of pay, were subject to review on an 
annual rotating basis by each of the councils, the whole process coordinated centrally by 
H‘. … the fiŶal ƌatifiĐatioŶ to H‘ poliĐǇ is ŵade at the policy forums, a body which affords 
council representatives access to key decision makers.͟ (Butler, 2009, p. 205) 
While the Interbank forum does Ŷot eŶgage iŶ ďaƌgaiŶiŶg, the ĐoŶsultatioŶ oŶ ͚ƌeǁaƌd͛ poliĐǇ 
appears to move in that direction with other characteristics of more traditional employment 
relations.  For example, as the weekly update (March 4
th
 2005) suggested: 
͞;Harry) met up with Reward this week. The fleǆiďle ďeŶefits paĐkage ǁhiĐh ;͚IŶterďaŶk͛) 
is ĐoŶsideƌiŶg is up foƌ ƌeǀieǁ … theŶ the paĐkage ǁill go out to ǁideƌ ĐoŶsultatioŶ. ;The 
employee forums) will be included of course. During the meeting the subject of overtime 
in the Contact Centre was raised. Reward feels strongly that it is currently excessive given 
that some Associates are now earning (with bonus included) up to 30K pa. They feel that 
giǀeŶ as ;͚IŶterďaŶk͛Ϳ is lookiŶg to keep Đosts ͞flat͟ eǆĐessiǀe oǀeƌtiŵe is Ŷot iŶ seƌǀiĐe of 
the gaŵe…. TheǇ aƌe lookiŶg to ƋuestioŶ the ǀaliditǇ aŶd faiƌŶess ŵoǀiŶg foƌǁaƌd, 
espeĐiallǇ siŶĐe otheƌ aƌeas of ;͚IŶterďaŶk͛Ϳ haǀe appaƌeŶtlǇ ͞oǀeƌtiŵe ďaŶs͟ iŶ plaĐe.͟  
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After a takeover by a large multinational bank as well as the recent finance crash, the officers in a 
group catch-up interview indicated a move to a more formalised approach to relations at Interbank.  
After the takeover ďǇ a U“A ďased ďaŶk, ͚MultiPareŶt͛, many of the policies were re-examined:  
We were consulted over car policy.  The usual thing would be that we have a conversation 
outliŶiŶg the Đaƌ poliĐǇ.  We go thƌough it … ͞MultiParent͟ doesŶ͛t have company cars 
and are going to have to do something about that. (MultiParent)  are not going to manage 
a fleet. ...  So they were going to do something to compensate people.  So we had that 
process and we went through it, the decision was made ... we got reasonable change of 
process for people with cars.  But it wasn't really documented and it wasn't minuted and 
our proposals weren't doĐuŵeŶted so theƌe ǁas Ŷo ƌeĐoƌd…. We staƌted to ďe asked 
questions "Can we see the minutes of those consultations", and we realised then that 
actually we need to get more formal. So now when we have formal consultations, even 
formal conversations, every coŶsultatioŶ is ŵiŶuted, it͛s doĐuŵeŶted, it is opeŶ aŶd the 
people will see our proposal going in.  Although we still want option base consultation 
now it could be argued that you slip almost into negotiation. (Harry). 
While relations often remained informal between forum representatives and senior management 
there was also aŶ eleŵeŶt of foƌŵalisatioŶ; oŶe of the offiĐeƌs diffeƌeŶtiated ďetǁeeŶ ͚iŶfoƌŵal 
ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs͛ aŶd ͚foƌŵal ĐoŶsultatioŶ͛.  While this ŵaǇ ďe the iŵpaĐt of dealiŶg with changing 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt ƌegiŵes aŶd Đultuƌes, theƌe ǁeƌe also iŶdiĐatioŶs of a ͚ďaƌgaiŶiŶg͛ appƌoaĐh.  Fuƌtheƌ 
examples were outlined: 
͞The ďusiŶess ǁaŶted to ďuǇ folks out of their bonus rights and they put a proposal for 
6%.  We put a counterproposal for 7 ½ per-cent with a whole bunch of bells and whistles 
on it. Of the four of five tenets that we put forward they went with three including the 7 
1/2 per-cent rather than the six per-ĐeŶt.  Noǁ is that ŶegotiatioŶ? Is that ĐoŶsultatioŶ?͟ 
(Harry) 
While officers claimed that "we would never use the N word" there was, we suggest, ambiguity in 
the activity they were engaged in.  
Non-Union Employee Representatives at Interbank: An Ambiguous Role 
Unlike many of the non-union consultation forums that have been examined elsewhere (Charlwood 
and Terry, 2007) the officers at Interbank developed a deliberate and sustained engagement with 
senior management at all levels. This engagement  was extended  beyond parochial -  ͚sausages in 
the ĐaŶteeŶ͛ issues  ;Dundon and Rollinson, 2004; Butler, 2005; Gollan, 2003). It is clear that 
Page | 19  
 
employee representation was established by senior management to both comply with ICE regulation 
and to exclude trade union recognition.  However analysis of the employee forum as it developed, 
and particularly the role and activities of its officers, indicates a far from static institution. In practice 
it is difficult to understand the evolution and development of the forum without its officers͛ aĐtioŶs.  
While these may be decisivethey are also deeply ambiguous.  In the final section, we explore these 
aŵďiguities iŶ ƌelatioŶ to tƌade uŶioŶs, to ŵaŶageŵeŶt, aŶd to ͚Interbank people͛ i.e. the employees 
they represent.   
Trade Unions 
Two  forum officers, Derek and Harry, remained members of Unite following their transfer from 
InsuranceCo on the establishment of Interbank.  While they blocked mass recruitment by the union 
on site for collective representation they seemed, occasionally, to recommend union membership 
for individual cases.  Officers also engaged with trade unions over issues such as collective 
redundancies, not uncommon in the turbulence of ownership and frequent rationalisation of 
Interbank. More generally amongst the officers there was a feeling that the very language and 
approach of the unions, who they sometimes symptomatically ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚the ďƌotheƌs͛, were 
alien to the language and culture of Interbank ǁith the ŶotioŶs of ͚ďaƌgaiŶiŶg͛ aŶd ͚agƌeeŵeŶts͛ 
both bureaucratic and fundamentally at odds with the informality of Interbank. 
Relationships with Senior Management 
Perhaps the most ambiguous relationship was that with senior management.  On the one hand the 
officers realised that their position was based ultimately on the patronage of Senior Management 
and particularly of the CEO.  In the continued uncertainties of Interbank life, change of CEO – change 
that occurred on average about every two years and sometimes more frequently – presented a 
ĐƌitiĐal peƌiod of atteŵpted ͚ƌelatioŶship ďuildiŶg͛ ǁith a Ŷeǁ iŶĐuŵďeŶt aŶd peƌhaps ŵaŶageŵeŶt 
team.  High turnover generally meant such transience occurred at all management levels requiring 
continual establishment and maintenance of relationships with more junior and often inexperienced 
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managers.  This ŶotioŶ of ͚ƌelatioŶship͛ ǁas ĐeŶtƌal to the appƌoaĐh of the foƌuŵ aŶd its offiĐeƌs.  
Derek contrasted this approach with that of conventional employment relations: 
When a trade union has challeŶged us ͚Ǉou͛ǀe got Ŷo paƌtŶeƌship agƌeeŵeŶt iŶ plaĐe, 
Ǉou͛ǀe got Ŷo pƌoĐeduƌal agƌeeŵeŶt͛ ŵǇ oǁŶ ǀieǁ is it doesŶ͛t ŵatteƌ.  Take the ǁeddiŶg 
ĐoŶtƌaĐt foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, Ǉou͛ǀe ďoth sigŶed it ďut if the ƌelatioŶship ďƌeaks doǁŶ the papeƌ 
ŵeaŶs ŶothiŶg.  It͛s the relationship first and foremost. 
Despite the closeness to senior management the forum sought to construct its own independent 
identity distinct from management within and beyond the contact centre and the confines of 
Interbank (see also Butler, 2005).  While ͚ƌelatioŶships͛ pƌedoŵiŶated aŶd the foƌuŵ ĐoŶĐeŶtƌated 
on consultation over integrative issues rather than distributive ones (Charlwood and Terry, 2007) 
these appeared to become more formalised perhaps taking on many of the characteristics of 
bargaining.   
With the Ǯpeopleǯ 
The average age of  employees was in the mid-twenties, with an attrition rate  up to 40%, a career 
expectation of around two or three years. Many left within the first weeks of employment. For many 
it was first employment after leaving University.  In this context, the three full-time officers were 
unrepresentative of the typically younger ͚Interbank people ͛ and being more than twice the average 
age of other colleagues, having enjoyed long careers within the finance sector and – in two cases – 
transferred from InsuranceCo. all worked at the contact centre from its beginning.  To a large extent, 
this very longevity gave a cachet with management who, almost invariably, were also younger and 
less experienced in the procedures and culture of the company.  Further,  offiĐeƌs͛ independence 
from the formal, or perhaps informal, hierarchy of Interbank legitimised their relationship building 
and dominated consultations with management on policies and procedures. Most ambiguous of all 
the offiĐeƌs ǁeƌe the ͚ǀoiĐe͛ of ͚the people͛ ďut Ŷot an aggregation of that voice  if anything seeing 
themselves acting in a form of in-loco parentis and providing advice and assistance in times of 
employee needs.   
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Conclusion 
We pointed to the insecurity of the work environment at Interbank. Finally this led to the 
termination of longitudinal research and perhaps of the forum itself.  In terms of our research the 
takeover by ParentCo, coinciding also with the financial crash, meant that access to the contact 
centre and the officers became more difficult.  While officers boasted survival and perhaps the 
capacity to introduce employee voice into an alien environment, at the same time suspicions 
seemed to rise.  The last visit occurred after the crash in early 2010.  Perhaps this was symptomatic 
of other changes which were being planned by ParentCo.  Interbank went through one of its 
frequent rationalisations. Harry, heir apparent to Derek as employee chair, left Interbank as one of 
the redundancies. The rationalisation itself may have been the precondition of the break-up of 
Interbank again put on the market with closure of the contact centre and the accounts split between 
two separate buyers and we  are uncertain as to whether the employee voice arrangements 
survived. 
We argue that these forum officers were  beholden to senior management and reliant upon their 
patronage. However, the officers exercised influence by engaging with strategy and operations at 
Interbank.  First, they ultimately resisted the recognition of a trade union, fearing the forum would 
become subsumed by a larger representative movement. This showed they were not to be viewed 
as a nascent trade union at Interbank, but aspired to play a significant and permanent role in 
Interbank͛s employee representation strategy.  Second, the officers reflected other forums, and 
particularly some European Works Councils, in that they initially had few rights, but then broadened 
theiƌ ƌeŵit ǁith ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛s aĐƋuiesĐeŶĐe (Lecher et al, 2001; Knudsen et al, 2007).  These 
policies saw forum offices developing their own profiles and roles within Interbank, for example, 
they channelled information to employees and advised them over issues pertaining to operational 
issues such as discipline and grievance. These activities maintained a working relationship with 
senior management and employees alike, and in return the officers were permitted autonomous 
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control of budgets and time-management. Officers acquired increased levels of legitimacy, by, for 
example, achieving positive results over bonus payments and car policy - representative functions 
which might be categorised as delivering expected results for employees (see Hyman, 1997; ).  In 
acquiring company knowledge and applying this to continually develop their commitments 
programmes, they formally briefed and then interacted ǁith thƌee ŶeǁlǇ aƌƌiǀed CEO͛s; these 
processes facilitated the forums formal presence in the architecture of Interbank, and it also ensured 
the officers aǀoided the ͚kŶoǁledge͛ deficits excluding representatives from company planning seen 
elsewhere ( see Whittall et al, 2009). Third, by attachment to their roles and activities they 
presented a new and purposeful identity to senior management, primarily seen when they 
articulated employee demands and aspirations to senior management (see Hege and Dufour, 1995).  
The officers recognised that limitations existed over influence. The officers did not attempt to de-
stabilise ͚ƌelatioŶships͛ with senior management or employees, but instead their chosen policy of 
consultation rather than collective bargaining or negotiation maintained their presence as one 
constant in an ever-changing employment scenario. The example here is that NERs can co-exist with 
management, but are likely to be more successful if they adopt policies which facilitate 
communication and consultation, rather than insisting upon equality through collective bargaining. 
The data fƌoŵ this aƌtiĐle͛s loŶgitudiŶal Đase studǇ suggests these paƌtiĐulaƌ NE‘͛s allegiaŶĐes aŶd 
roles remain ambiguous, existing as they do in the intersection between consultation and collective 
bargaining. Any change to this position in UK workplaces is likely to demand representatives gaining 
access to a more stable power bases within organisations and movements towards the sharing of 
decision-making with senior management. The circumstances and environments where this may be 
found, and whether this can be a permanent state of affairs, would be fruitful areas for further 
research.  
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